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11 Introduction
Competitive interactions between two players are quite common, and it is
desirable to know whether such a competition has a value. That is, whether
there is some quantity such that for every ε > 0 the maximizing player
can guarantee to receive, on average, at least this quantity (up to ε), and
the minimizing player can guarantee to pay, on average, no more than this
quantity (up to ε). Once the value exists, ﬁnding ε-optimal strategies for the
two players (which guarantee that they receive at least the value, or pay no
more than the value, up to ε) is also desirable.
When the interaction lasts for a single stage, or for a bounded number of
stages, existence of the value is usually proven using a ﬁxed-point argument,
and hinges on the continuity of the payoﬀ in the strategies of the players.
When the duration of the interaction is long but not known in advance, it
is convenient to assume that the interaction lasts for countably many stages
(see Aumann and Maschler (1995, p.143) and Neyman and Sorin (2002) for
justiﬁcations). However, in this formulation, the payoﬀ is often not contin-
uous in the strategies of the players, and therefore one cannot use standard
ﬁxed-point theorems to prove the existence of the value. Various techniques
where employed in the literature to handle this problem (see, e.g., Mertens
and Neyman, 1981, Maitra and Sudderth, 1993, 1998, and Nowak, 1985),
but it seems that each technique can be applied only in some models, under
special conditions, or is not constructive.
Here we present another tool for proving existence of the value in inﬁnite-
stage competitive interactions, or two-player zero-sum dynamic games. We
show how a stochastic variation of Ramsey theorem1 can be used to reduce
the analysis of the inﬁnite-stage interaction to the analysis of ﬁnite-stage
interactions.
To exhibit the new technique, we apply it to the following generalization
of stopping games (see Dynkin, 1969). At the outset of the game, the state
of the world is chosen according to some known probability distribution,
but is not told to the players. At every stage of the game, the players
learn some information concerning the state of the world; both receive the
same information. Then each player chooses an action. The pair of actions,
together with the state of the world, determine a probability of termination,
1Ramsey theorem (Ramsey, 1930) states that for every coloring of the complete inﬁnite
graph by ﬁnitely many colors there is a complete inﬁnite monochromatic sub-graph.
2and a terminal payoﬀ if the game terminates at that stage. If the game never
terminates, the payoﬀ to both players is 0.
The goal of the maximizing player is to maximize the expected payoﬀ,
and the goal of the minimizing player is to minimize this quantity.
The paper is arranged as follows. In section 2 we formally present the
model and the main result, stating that in our model the value exists. In
section 3 we state the stochastic variation of Ramsey theorem that we use,
and we apply it to our model to exhibit the new technique. Further discussion
is relegated to section 4.
2 The Model and the Main Result
We consider inﬁnite-stage dynamic games in discrete time that are given by
• A probability space (Ω,F,P), that captures the uncertainty about the
state of the world. We denote by E the expectation w.r.t. P.
• A ﬁltration (Fn)n∈N, that describes the information available to both
players at stage n.
• Two measurable spaces (A,A) and (B,B) of actions for the two players.
• For each n ∈ N, Fn ⊗ A ⊗ B-measurable functions pn : Ω × A × B →
[0,1] and gn : Ω × A × B → [−1,1]. pn indicates the probability of
termination, while gn indicates the terminal payoﬀ.
The game is played as follows. At the outset of the game, a state of
the world ω ∈ Ω is chosen according to the probability measure P. At
every stage n, the players choose independently and simultaneously actions
an ∈ A and bn ∈ B. Players’ choices must be measurable with regard to their
information, namely, Fn and previously played actions. With probability
pn(an,bn) the game terminates, and the terminal payoﬀ is gn(an,bn). With
probability 1 − pn(ω) the game continues to stage n + 1.
Our model is a generalization of stopping games (see, e.g., Dynkin, 1969,
Rosenberg et al., 2001, or Touzi and Vieille, 2002). It is also closely related
to general stochastic games (see, e.g., Nowak, 1985, or Maitra and Sudderth,
1998).
For every measurable space M, denote by P(M) the space of probability
distributions over M.
3The space of inﬁnite plays is (A×B)N×Ω. We equip it with the product
σ-algebra (A⊗B)N ⊗F. We denote by Gn = (A×B)n−1 ⊗Fn the σ-algebra
that represents the information available for the players at stage n. It is
convenient to consider Fn as sub-σ-algebra of Gn.
A strategy σ = (σn)n∈N of player 1 is a collection of functions such that
σn : (A × B)N × Ω → P(A) is Gn-measurable, for every n ∈ N. Strategies τ
of player 2 are deﬁned analogously.
Every pair (σ,τ) of strategies, together with P, naturally deﬁnes a proba-
bility distribution over (A×B)N×Ω. The corresponding expectation operator
is denoted by Eσ,τ.
Denote by θ the stage of termination, so that θ = +∞ if termination
never occurs. For every pair (σ,τ) of strategies, the expected payoﬀ is
γ(σ,τ) = Eσ,τ[1{θ<+∞}gθ(aθ,bθ)],
where 1 is the indicator function.
The goal of player 1 is to maximize the expected payoﬀ, while the goal of
player 2 is to minimize this quantity.








holds, then the common value is the value of the game. Given ε ≥ 0, every
strategy σ of player 1 that attains the supremum on the left-hand side of (1)
up to ε is ε-optimal for player 1. Every strategy τ of player 2 that attains
the inﬁmum on the right-hand side of (1) up to ε is ε-optimal for player 2.
Our main result is the following
Theorem 1 If A,B are compact metric spaces, and the functions gn(ω,·,·)
and pn(ω,·,·) are continuous for every ω ∈ Ω and every n ∈ N, the game
has a value.
Remark 1 We have chosen to study a simple model, where the action sets
are compact and independent of the stage or the information available for
the players. The latter assumption is without loss of generality, as one can
always add “ﬁctitious” actions for player 1, that yield extremely low payoﬀ,
and “ﬁctitious” actions for player 2, that yield extremely high payoﬀ. The
4former assumption can be relaxed; all that we need is to be able to apply a
Minimax theorem. Thus, our technique extends to the case where A and B
are Borel spaces, and one of them is compact, as well as to other setups, see
section 4.
Our main contribution is not in the technical result, but in the new tech-
nique that we use for the proof.
We now brieﬂy compare our result to existing literature. Under some reg-
ularity assumptions on (Ω,F,P), the model we consider is a class of general
stochastic games. Maitra and Sudderth (1993, 1998) proved the existence of
the value in a most general setup of stochastic games.
Maitra and Sudderth (1993), using the operator approach and transﬁnite
induction, proved that every stochastic game admits a value, and both players
have universally measurable ε-optimal strategies, for every ε > 0. Relative
to this result, our contribution is that we give a constructive argument for
the existence of ε-optimal strategies, which are also uniformly ε-optimal in a
sense deﬁned below (see section 4).
Maitra and Sudderth (1998), using the fact that every Borel game is
solvable, proved that every stochastic game admits a value, and both players
have ﬁnitely-additive ε-optimal strategies, for every ε > 0 (see also Martin,
1998). Thus, relative to this result, our contribution is that both players
have σ-additive uniformly ε-optimal strategies for every ε > 0, rather than
ﬁnitely additive.
Rosenberg et al. (2001), using the technique of vanishing discount factors,
proved that the value exists when the sets A and B are ﬁnite.
3 The Proof
3.1 A stochastic variation of Ramsey Theorem
Ramsey theorem (Ramsey, 1930) can be stated as follows. For every function
c that attaches to every two non-negative integers k < l an element c(k,l) ∈
C, where C is a ﬁnite set, there is an increasing sequence of integers k1 <
k2 < ... such that c(k1,k2) = c(ki,kj) for every i < j.
We are going to attach for every non-negative integer n and every stopping
time τ a Fn-measurable function cn,τ, whose range is some ﬁnite set C. We
also impose a consistency requirement: if τ1 = τ2 on a Fn-measurable set F,
5then cn,τ1 = cn,τ2 on F. Under these conditions, a weaker conclusion than
that of Ramsey theorem can be derived: for every ε > 0 there exists an
increasing sequence of stopping times ν1 < ν2 < ... such that P(cν1,ν2 =
cν2,ν3 = cν3,ν4 = ···) > 1 − ε.
Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space, and (Fn) a ﬁltration. A stopping
time ν is adapted (to the ﬁltration (Fn)n∈N) if for every n ∈ N, the set
{ν = n} is Fn-measurable. In the sequel, all stopping times are adapted.
For every A,B ∈ F, A holds on B if and only if P(Ac ∩ B) = 0.
Deﬁnition 2 A NT-function is a function that assigns to every integer n ≥
0 and every bounded stopping time ν a Fn-measurable r.v. that is deﬁned over
the set {ν > n}. We say that a NT-function f is C-valued, for some set C,
if the r.v. fn,ν is C-valued, for every n ≥ 0 and every ν.
Deﬁnition 3 A NT-function f is consistent if for every n ≥ 0, every Fn-
measurable set F, and every two bounded stopping times ν1,ν2, we have
ν1 = ν2 > n on F implies fn,ν1 = fn,ν2 on F.
When f is a NT-function, and ν1 < ν2 are two bounded stopping times,
we denote fν1,ν2(ω) = fν1(ω),ν2(ω). Thus fν1,ν2 is a Fν1-measurable r.v.
The following stochastic variation of Ramsey Theorem was proved by
Shmaya and Solan (2002, Theorem 4.3)
Theorem 2 For every ﬁnite set C, every C-valued consistent NT-function
f, and every  > 0, there exists a sequence of bounded stopping times 1 ≤
ν1 < ν2 < ν3 < ... such that
P(fν1,ν2 = fν2,ν3 = fν3,ν4 = ...) > 1 − .
3.2 Application to games
For every two bounded stopping times ν1 < ν2, and every Fν2-measurable
function h, Let Γ(ν1,ν2,h) be the two-player zero-sum game that starts at
stage ν1 and, if not terminated earlier, terminates at stage ν2 with terminal
payoﬀ h. We do not introduce a new concept of a strategy in Γ(ν1,ν2,h).
Rather, we take the strategy space in Γ(ν1,ν2,h) to coincide with that of Γ,
and we will condition on the event {θ ≥ ν1}.
The following standard lemma states that Γ(ν1,ν2,h) admits a value (see,
e.g., Nowak, 1985, Theorem 5.2). It follows using backward induction from
6Sion’s (1958) Minimax theorem and a measurable selection theorem (e.g.,
Kuratowski and Ryll-Nardzewski, 1965).
Lemma 1 Let ν1 < ν2 be bounded stopping times, and h a Fν2-measurable
function such that khk∞ ≤ 1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, there ex-
ists a Fν1-measurable function v(Γ(ν1,ν2,h)), and a pair (σ∗,τ∗) of strategies
such that for every pair (σ0,τ0) of strategies,
Eσ∗,τ0[1{ν1≤θ<ν2}gθ(aθ,bθ) + 1{θ2≤θ}h | Gν1] ≥ v(Γ(ν1,ν2,h))1{ν1≤θ},and
Eσ0,τ∗[1{ν1≤θ<ν2}gθ(aθ,bθ) + 1{θ2≤θ}h | Gν1] ≤ v(Γ(ν1,ν2,h))1{ν1≤θ}.
(2)
Actually, there are optimal strategies σ∗ = (σ∗




n are Fn-measurable, rather than Gn-measurable (that is, the
actions chosen at each stage n do not depend on previously chosen actions).
Moreover, one can verify that (2) still holds if we replace in Lemma 1 σ∗ by
any strategy σ such that, for every n ∈ N, σn = σ∗
n on {ν1 ≤ n < ν2}.
The following Lemma summarizes simple monotonicity and continuity
properties of the value operator.
Lemma 2 (a) If khk∞ < 1 then kv(Γ(ν1,ν2,h))k∞ ≤ 1
(b) If ν1 < ν2 < ν3, then v(Γ(ν1,ν2,v(Γ(ν2,ν3,h)))) = v(Γ(ν1,ν3,h)).
(c) If F ∈ Gν1 and h ≤ h0 on F, then v(ν1,ν2,h) ≤ v(ν1,ν2,h0) on F.
(d) If F ∈ Gν1 and limn→∞hn = h on F, then limn→∞ v(ν1,ν2,hn) =
v(ν1,ν2,h) on F.
Set C = {‘+’,‘−’}, and deﬁne a C-valued NT-function c as follows. For
every n ∈ N and every stopping time ν,
c(n,ν) =

‘+’ if v(Γ(n,ν,0)) > 0,
‘+’ if v(Γ(n,ν,0)) ≤ 0.
Lemma 2(c) implies that c is a consistent NT-function.
Fix, once and for all ε > 0. By Theorem 2 there exists an increasing
sequence (νk) of adapted stopping times such that
P(c(ν1,ν2) = c(ν2,ν3) = c(ν3,ν4) = ···) > 1 − ε. (3)
73.3 An auxiliary game
For every k ∈ N deﬁne
E
+
k = {c(ν1,ν2) = ‘+’ and c(νk,νk+1) = ‘−’}, and
E
−









k are in Fνk.
We now deﬁne an auxiliary game Γ0
ε. Γ0
ε is similar to Γ, except that it
has a diﬀerent payoﬀ function (g0









k and n ≥ k,
gn(ω) otherwise.
Thus, whenever c(νk,νk+1) 6= c(ν1,ν2), we set the payoﬀ to be 0 from stage
νk and onwards.
Denote by γ0(σ,τ) the expected payoﬀ under the pair of strategies (σ,τ)
in Γ0





k )) < ε, and since payoﬀs are
bounded by 1, for every pair of strategies (σ,τ) one has |γ(σ,τ)−γ0(σ,τ)| < ε.
3.4 Suﬃciency of the analysis of the auxiliary game
The following lemma asserts that if for every ε > 0 there are 3ε-optimal
strategies in Γ0
ε, then the original game admits a value.
Lemma 3 If for every ε > 0 there exist Vε ∈ [−1,1] and a pair (σε,τε) of
strategies that satisfy infτ0 γ0(σε,τ0) ≥ Vε − 3ε and supσ0 γ0(σ0,τε) ≤ Vε + 3ε,
then V := limε→0 Vε exists, and is the value of Γ.
Observe that we do not require that Vε is the value of Γ0
ε, or, for that
matter, that the games (Γ0
ε)ε have values.
Proof. Let V be any accumulation point of the sequence (Vε)ε>0 as ε goes
to 0. Since |γ(σ,τ)−γ0(σ,τ)| < ε, the assumptions imply that infτ0 γ(σε,τ0) ≥
Vε − 4ε and supσ0 γ(σ0,τε) ≤ Vε + 4ε.
Therefore, for every δ there is ε > 0 suﬃciently small such that infτ0 γ(σε,τ0) ≥
Vε − 4ε ≥ V − δ and supσ0 γ(σ0,τε) ≤ Vε + 4ε ≤ V + δ. In particular, V is
the value of Γ.
Thus, our goal is to ﬁnd Vε ∈ R and to construct a pair (σ,τ) of strategies
such that infτ0 γ0(σ,τ0) ≥ Vε − 3ε and supσ0 γ0(σ0,τ) ≤ Vε + 3ε.
In section 3.5 we deﬁne Vε. In section 3.6 we deﬁne σ, and in section 3.7
we prove that infτ0 γ0(σ,τ0) ≥ Vε − 3ε. The construction of τ, and the proof
that supσ0 γ0(σ0,τ) ≤ Vε + 3ε, is analogous to that of σ, hence omitted.
83.5 Properties of the coloring
By construction of Γ0
ε, If v(Γ0
ε(ν1,ν2,0)) > 0 then v(Γ0
ε(νk,νk+1,0)) ≥ 0 for
every k ∈ N, whereas if v(Γ0
ε(ν1,ν2,0)) ≤ 0 then v(Γ0
ε(νk,νk+1,0)) ≤ 0 for
every k ∈ N.
Let D+ = {v(Γ0
ε(ν1,ν2,0)) > 0} ∈ Fν1, and D− = {v(Γ0
ε(ν1,ν2,0)) ≤ 0} ∈
Fν1. Plainly, (D+,D−) is a partition of Ω.
On D+, v(Γ0
















In particular, for every ﬁxed k ∈ N, the sequence (v(Γ0
ε(νk,νl,0))l>k is a
sequence of Fνk-measurable functions, monotonic non-decreasing on D+, and
monotonic non-increasing on D−. In particular, this sequence has a limit h∗
k,
which is Fνk-measurable.




















Set Vε = E[v(Γ0
ε(1,ν1,h∗
1))].
3.6 Deﬁnition of a strategy σ





1 − ε}) > P(D+) − ε. (5)
For every k ∈ N choose for player 1 an optimal strategy σk in the game
Γ0
ε(νk,νk+1,0), and an optimal strategy σ∗
k in the game Γ0
ε(νk,νk+1,h∗
k+1).
Choose for player 1 an optimal strategy σ1,l in the game Γ0
ε(ν1,νl,0).
Finally, choose for player 1 an optimal strategy σ0 in the game Γ0
ε(1,ν1,h∗
1).
Recall that D+ and D− are Fν1-measurable. Deﬁne a strategy σ for player
1 as follows.
9• σ follows σ0 up to stage ν1.
• If ω ∈ D−, σ follows σ∗
k between stages νk and νk+1, for every k ∈ N.
• If ω ∈ D+, σ follows σ1,l between stages ν1 and νl. Then, for every
k ≥ l, it follows σk between stages νk and νk+1.
3.7 The strategy σ is 3ε-optimal
Let τ0 be an arbitrary strategy of player 2. We prove that γ0(σ,τ0) ≥ Vε−3ε.
For convenience, set rθ = g0
θ(aθ,bθ) if θ < +∞ and rθ = 0 if θ = +∞. This
is the terminal payoﬀ in the game.
Since σ1,l is optimal in Γ0
ε(ν1,νl,0),
Eσ,τ0[1{ν1≤θ<νl}rθ | Gν1] ≥ v(Γ
0
ε(ν1,νl,0))1{ν1≤θ} on D+. (6)
Since for every k ∈ N, σk is optimal in Γ0
ε(νk,νk+1,0),
Eσ,τ0[1{νk≤θ<νk+1}rθ | Gνk] ≥ v(Γ
0
ε(νk,νk+1,0))1{νk≤θ} ≥ 0 on D+.
Taking conditional expectation w.r.t. Gν1, and summing over k ≥ l, gives us
Eσ,τ0[1{νl≤θ}rθ | Gν1] ≥ 0 on D+ (7)
From (6) and (7) we have
Eσ,τ0[1{ν1≤θ}rθ | Gν1] ≥ v(Γ
0
ε(ν1,νl,0))1{ν1≤θ} on D+.








Since for every k ∈ N σ∗
k is optimal in Γ0
ε(νk,νk+1,h∗













By (9) and an iterative use of Lemma 2(c), for every m > 1 one has
E[1{ν1≤θ<νm}rθ + 1{νm≤θ}h
∗
m | Gν1] ≥ 1{ν1≤θ}h
∗
1 on D−.
10Since on D− h∗
m ≤ 0 for every m, it follows by taking expectation that,










By (8) and (10),
Eσ,τ0[1{ν1≤θ}rθ] ≥ E[1{ν1≤θ}h
∗
1] − 3. (11)









1))] = Vε. (12)
By (11) and (12),
γ
0(σ,τ
0) = Eσ,τ0[rθ] ≥ Vε − 3ε. (13)
4 Further Discussion
Here we discuss the assumptions that our proof hinges on, as well as further
topics.
Our argument hinges on the assumption that the evolution of the game is
independent of the actions chosen by the players. That is, the players cannot
aﬀect the information that they receive along the game. All they control is
the probability of termination and the terminal payoﬀ. It is most desirable
to extend our technique to the case that players do aﬀect their information.
Another aspect that we critically need is the fact that the information
is symmetric: both players have the same information at every stage. If
this is not the case, then the value need not exist (see Laraki, 2000, for an
example.) It is interesting to see under which informational structure the
value still exists.
The strategy σ that we constructed in section 3.6 is uniform in the fol-
lowing sense. There is n ≥ 0 such that
inf
τ Eσ,τ[1{θ≤n}gθ(aθ,bθ)] ≥ Vε − 5ε.
11That is, the strategy σ is 5ε+|V −Vε|-optimal in every ﬁnite-stage interaction,
provided the interaction is suﬃciently long.
The proof relies on the observation that if for some bounded stopping time
ν, where ν ≥ νk for k suﬃciently large, the expected payoﬀ under (σ,τ) up to
stage ν is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from Vε, then the probability of termination
between stages νk and ν must be bounded away from 0. Therefore, such an
event can occur only ﬁnitely many times. Details are standard and omitted.
We assumed that the functions pn(ω,·,·) and gn(ω,·,·) are continuous for
every ω ∈ Ω. However, all that we need is that for every Fn+1-measurable
function f, the one-stage game Γ(n,n+1,f) with terminal payoﬀ f admits a
value. More formally, we now present a more general version of the one-shot
game.
Deﬁnition 4 Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space, X and Y two measurable
sets of strategies, and u: Ω×X ×Y → [−1,1] be measurable payoﬀ function.
The game (Ω,F,P,X,Y,u) admits a value if there exist a F-measurable
function v: Ω → [−1,1], and, for every  > 0, there exist F-measurable




0,y(ω)) −  ≤ v(ω) ≤ inf
y0∈Y
u(ω,x(ω),y
0) + , P − a.e.
The proof of the following extension of Theorem 1 follows the same lines
as the proof we presented.
Theorem 3 Let Γ = (Ω,F,P,(Fn),A,B,(gn,pn)) be an inﬁnite-stage dy-
namic game. Assume that for every n ∈ N and every Fn-measurable func-
tion h: Ω → [−1,1] the one-shot game (Ω,Fn,P,P(A),P(B),u) admits a




B pn(a,b)gn(a,b) + (1 − pn(a,b))h dx(a)dy(b).
Then the game Γ admits a value.
The stochastic variation of Ramsey theorem that we use can be applied to
prove existence of an equilibrium in two-player non-zero-sum stopping games
in discrete time (see Shmaya and Solan, 2002). However, whereas for non-
zero-sum ﬁnite-stage games a lot of structure is needed to ensure existence of
an equilibrium that satisﬁes certain desirable properties, for zero-sum games
the technique works in a much more general setup.
12References
[1] Aumann R.J. and Maschler M.B. (1995) Repeated Games with Incom-
plete Information, The MIT Press
[2] Dynkin E.B. (1969) Game Variant of a Problem on Optimal Stopping,
Soviet Math. Dokl., 10, 270-274
[3] Kuratowski K. and Ryll-Nardzewski C. (1965) A General Theorem on
Selectors, Bull. Acad. Polon. Sci. Ser. Sci. Math. Astronom. Phys., 13,
397-403
[4] Laraki R. (2000) Jeux r´ ep´ et´ es ` a information incompl` ete: approche vari-
ationnelle, Th` ese de Doctorat de l’Univ´ ersit´ e Paris 6, France.
[5] Maitra A. and Sudderth W. (1993) Borel Stochastic Games with Limsup
Payoﬀ, Ann. Probab., 21, 861-885
[6] Maitra A. and Sudderth W. (1998) Finitely Additive Stochastic Games
with Borel Measurable Payoﬀs, Int. J. Game Theory, 27, 257-267
[7] Martin D.A. (1998) The Determinacy of Blackwell Games. J. Symbolic
Logic, 63, 1565-1581
[8] Mertens J.F. and Neyman A. (1981) Stochastic Games, Int. J. Game
Th., 10, 53-66
[9] Neyman A. and Sorin S. (2001) Zero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games
with Public Uncertain Duration Process, Discussion paper 259, Center
for Rationality, The Hebrew Univeristy of Jerusalem
[10] Nowak A.S. (1985) Universally Measurable Strategies in Zero-Sum
Stochastic Games, Ann. Probab., 13, 269-287
[11] Ramsey F.P. (1930) On a Problem of Formal Logic, Proc. London Math.
Society, 30, 264-286
[12] Rosenberg D., Solan E. and Vieille N. (2001) Stopping Games with
Randomized Strategies, Probab. Th. Related Fields, 119, 433-451
13[13] Shmaya E. and Solan E. (2002) Two-Player Non-Zero-Sum Stopping
Games in Discrete Time, Discussion paper 1347, Center for Mathemat-
ical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Kellogg School of
Management, Northwestern University
[14] Sion M. (1958) On General Minimax Theorems, Paciﬁc J. Math., 8,
171-176
[15] Touzi N. and Vieille N. (2002) Continuous-Time Dynkin Games with
Mixed Strategies. SIAM J. Cont. Opt., 41, 1073-1088
14